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NOTES AND COMMENT
THE NATURE OF ACTIONAiLE NEGLIGENCE.-"The plaintiff sues
in her own right for a wrong personal to her, and not as the vicarious
beneficiary of a breach of duty to another." 1 This sentence from
the prevailing opinion in a case recently decided by the New York
Court of Appeals contains the gist of that decision. Involving, as
is does, the basis of the theory as to the nature of negligence, it
presents an excellent starting point for a discussion of that question.
The facts involved in the case were not disputed. Plaintiff was
standing on a platform of defendant's railroad intending to take
passage on a train. Whild she waited, a train 'bound for some other
point arrived at th6 station. After the signal for the train to proceed
had been given two men ran forward to catch it. One of them
reached the platform of the car without mishap; but as the second of
the two men, who was carrying a package wrapped in newspaper
jumped upon the train, the defendant's trainman and platform man
took hold of him to help him on. As they did so, the package he
was carrying was dislodged, and fell, becoming wedged between the
train and the station platform. After the train moved a few feet the
package exploded and the concussion broke some scales standing a
considerable distance away. The scales fell, striking the plaintiff
and causing the injuries for which she sued.
The jury found a verdict in favor of the plaintiff which was
affirmed by the Appellate Division by a divided court.2 The Court
of Appeals reversed the judgment below, Judge Andrews writing a
dissenting opinion, in which Crane and O'Brien, JI., concurred.
The plaintiff's argument was directed to the question of proximate cause, and, stated briefly, was that the defendant set in motion
a series of events which almost instantly and without the intervention
of the act of any other person injured the plaintiff.a
The defendant's contention was that being ignorant of the contents of the package defendant's employees were not negligent in
assisting the man as they did, nor4 was their action, if negligent, the
proximate cause of the explosion.
IPalsgraf v. Long Island R. R. Go., 248 N. Y. 339, 162 N. E. 99 (1928).
'222 App. Div. 166, 225 N. Y. S.412 (2nd Dept. 1927).
1 Scott v. Shepard, 2 Win. Black, 892; Vandenburg v. Truax, 4 Denio 464
(1847); Guille v. Swan, 19 John (N. Y.) 381 (1822); Milwaukee Railway
Co. v. Kellogg, 94 U. S. 469 (Cir. Ct., Dist. of Iowa 1876); Lowery v. W. U.
Tel. Co., 60 N. Y. 198 (1875); Lowery v. Railway Co., 99 N. Y. 158, 1 N. E.
608 (1885).
' Paul v. Consol. Fireworks Co., 212 N. Y. 117, 105 N. E. 795 (1914) ; Hall
v. N. Y. Tel. Co., 214 N. Y. 49, 108 N. E. 182 (1915); Perry v. Rochester
Lime Co., 219 N. Y. 60, 113 N. E. 529 (1916) ; Pyne v. Cazenozia Canning Co.,
220 N. Y. 126, 115 N. E. 438 (1917); Adams v. Bullock, 227 N. Y. 208, 125
N. E. 93 (1919); McKinney v. N. Y. Cons. R. R. Co., 230 N. Y. 194, 129
N. E. 652 (1920); Palsey v. Waldorf-Astoria, Inc. & ano., 220 App. Div. 613,
222 N. Y. S. 273 (lst Dept. 1927); Parrott v. Wells-Fargo & Co., 15 Wall.
(U. S.) 524 (1872); A. T. & S. Fe Ry. Co. v. Calhoun, 213 U. S. 1, 53 L. Ed.
671, 29 Sup. Ct. 321 (1908).
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Since the Court confined itself to the theory as to the nature of
negligence, i. e., the question of whether or not there was a tort to be
redressed, and found that there wai not, it had no occasion to consider the law of causation.
The prevailing opinion written by Judge Cardozo states that the
conduct of the defendant's guard, if a wrong in relation to the holder
of the package, was not a wrong in its relation to the plaintiff, standing far away; that relatively to her it was not negligence at all. It
points out that nothing in the situation gave notice that the falling
package had in it the potency of peril to persons thus removed. "Negligence is not actionable unless it involves the invasion of a legally
protected interest, the violation of a right." 5 The Court cites
Salmond, Torts (6th Ed.), at page 24, where the author says:
"There is no negligence unless there is in the particular
case a legal duty to take care, and this duty must be one which
is owed to the plaintiff himself and not merely to others."
The two views on the question of the nature of negligence
diverge from this statement. Judge Andrews, in his dissenting opinion, thought it too narrow a conception and that where there is an act
which unreasonably threatens the safety of others, the doer is liable
for all its proximate consequences, even where they result in injury
to one who would generally be thought to be outside the radius of
danger. 6 Judge Cardozo, however, writing for the niajority, held
in substance that negligence is a relative concept-the breach of some
duty owing to a particular person or to particular persons.
An individual has a right to be protected against invasion of his
bodily security by acts which would in the thought of reasonable men
create the possibility of the occurrence of such an invasion. 7 But if
no risk is to be reasonably anticipated, an act will not assume the
quality of a tort as to one individual because it happens to be a tort
as to someone else. This seems to be the rule in most jurisdictions. 8
It has been said that one who drives down a crowded thoroughfare at a reckless rate of speed is negligent whether or not he strikes
an individual. 9 But, while we must agree with Judge Andrews that
'Supra, note 1 at 341.
6 Ibid., 347.
7

Paul v. Consol. Fireworks Co., Adams v. Bullock, Parrott v. Wells-Fargo

Co., supra, note 4.
s West Va. C. '& P. R. Co. v. State, 96 Md. 652, 666, 54 A. 669, 671, 61 L.
R. A. 574 (1903); Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Wood, 99 Va. 156, 158, 159, 37
S. E. 846 (1901) ; Hughes v. Boston R. R. Co., 71 N. H. 279, 284, 51 A. 1070,

93 Am. St. Rep. 518 (1902); U. S. Express Co. v. Everest, 72 Kan. 517, 83
P. 817 (1906); Emry v. Roanoke Navigation & Water Power Co., 111 N. C.

94, 95, 16 S. E. 18, 17 L. R. A. 669 (1892); Vaughan v. Transit Development
Co., 222 N. Y. 79, 118 N. E. 219 (1917) ; Losee v. Clute, 51 N. Y. 494 (1873) ;
De Caprio v. N. Y. C. R. R. Co., 231 N. Y. 94, 131 N. E. 746, 16 A. L. R.
940 (1921).
'Supra, note 1 at 349.
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the act is one of negligence, it is negligence only because the consequent possibility of damage is within the thought of reasonable men.
Even where a statutory direction is disregarded there is no violation
of the rights of those who do not come within the zone of apprehended
danger.' 0 This, however, does not mean that an individual must
have anticipated the manner in which the accident would occur, if the
possibility of an accident was within the apprehension of reasonably
prudent men."
The facts in the case of Parrott v. Wells-Fargo & Co., z2 were
quite similar to those in the Palsgraf case. The plaintiff in that
action sought damages for injury to his property caused by the
explosion of a package which was in defendant's possession as a
common carrier, and which unknown to the defendant contained
nitro-glycerine. Field, J., writing for the court, which affirmed a
judgment for defendant, said at page 536:
"It not, then, being his duty to know the contents of any
package offered to him for carriage, when there are no attendant circumstances awakening his suspicions as to their character, there can be no presumption of law that he had such
knowledge in any particular case of that kind, and he cannot
accordingly be charged as a matter of law with notice of the
properties and character of the packages thus received. * * *
The defendants, being innocently ignorant of the contents of
the case, received in the regular course of their business, were
not guilty of negligence in introducing it into their place of
business and handling it in the same manner as other packages
of similar outward appearance were usually handled. Negligence has been defined to be 'The omission to do something
which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which
ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or
doing something which a prudent and reasonable man would
not do.' It must be determined in all cases by reference to
the situation and knowledge of the parties and all the attending circumstances."
In the Palsgraf case the consequences complained of could not
reasonably have been anticipated from the alleged wrongful act, but
were only made possible by the fact that the passenger was carrying
a package of explosives, of which fact defendant was ignorant.
That the plaintiff sues in an action for defendant's negligence,
for breach of a duty owing to him individually is borne out by the
historical development of the subject. The central idea of the
" Boronkay v. Robinson & Carpenter, 247 N. Y. 365, 160 N. E. 400 (1927).
U Munsey v. Webb, 231 U. S. 150, 156, 34 S. Ct. 44, 45, 58 L. Ed. 162
(1913) ; Condran v. Park & Tilford, 213 N. Y. 341, 345, 107 N. E. 565 (1915) ;
Robert v. U. S. S. Emergency Fleet Corp., 240 N. Y. 474, 477, 148 N. E.
650 (1925).
'Supra, note 4.
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mediaval common law was that civil liability was based upon an act
causing damage, if that act fell within one of the causes of action
provided for by the law, and this idea excluded any direct reference
to negligence as a cause of liability. 13 Damage to the person was
remedied by trespass, which would only lie in the presence of a direct
act of violence to the individual harmed. But, since damage may
result to the person through the doing of an act lawful in itself, but
because of surrounding circumstances an act of violence to the injured
party, it was necessary to develop a new form of action, which was
known as trespass on the case.' 4 Thus it may be seen that the plaintiff in the early conception of negligence did not sue to recover for
the doing of a "wrong" as such, but rather that his right to bring an
action was the culmination of the development of the idea that he
had been personally wronged, although not by an act directed against
him personally, and so should be afforded a remedy.
The opinion of the Court of Appeals indicates that negligence
will not be considered as a tort unless it results in the commission of
a wrong, which in turn imports the violation of a right owing to the
individual seeking redress.

J.W. B.

CONTRACTS-MUTUALITY OF OBLIGATION.-It is ancient learning that mutual promises give rise to a contract. So long and well
settled is this proposition that the thought rarely arises to-day that
such was not always the law.' However, from that doctrine, there has
devolved the rule finding expression in the statement that there must
be mutuality of obligation to render a contract binding on the parties
thereto. Williston, in criticism thereof, says that "this form of statement is likely to cause confusion, and however limited, is at best an
unnecessary way of stating that there must be a valid consideration." 2
The criticism of the learned author is merited.
Primarily, where contract liability is sought to be imposed, the
quest is directed to ascertaining whether there is a valid consideration
supporting the obligation intended to be enforced. The rule embodied in the statement that there must be mutuality, as though that were
a requisite in the formation of contracts, is ofttimes an insecure
guidepost confounding the seeker. For mutuality of obligation is
never found in unilateral contracts; and the equitable as distinguished
from the legal tenet tends towards greater confusion, for lack of

'8

Holdsworth, History of English Law, p. 449.

14

Ibid.

The Growth of the Law, Honorable Benjamin N. Cardozo (p. 39).

Williston on Contracts, Vol. 1, Sec. 140.

